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An Examination of Internet 
Intermediaries and Hotel Loyalty 
Programs:
How Will Guests Get their Points? 
by Bill Carroll and Judy A. Siguaw
Competitive forces have made loyalty programs a key point of contention between hotel chains and the online intermediaries that sell hotel rooms using a merchant model. Hotel companies would prefer not to award 
points for the discounted rooms that they sell through the internet agencies. The 
intermediaries, on the other hand, would like to strengthen their position by offering 
hotel loyalty-program points. Ironically, although loyalty programs are costly for 
chains to operate, the cost of giving points is low for hotels, and the points have 
little intrinsic value for guests. Moreover, loyalty points are being used increasingly 
as a commodity that can be exchanged for goods or services not related to the hotel 
companies that issued them. Beyond that, an analysis of the game theory relating 
to the hotels’ position suggests that hotels will eventually want to award points for 
internet-merchant sales, if only to minimize losses if a competitor does so. Finally, 
although one internet intermediary has experimented with setting up its own loyalty-
point program, most seem to want to avoid taking on that expense. 
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1 Frederick Herzberg, Work and the Nature of Man, 
World Publishing (1966); Frederick Herzberg, “One More 
Time: How Do You Motivate Employees?” Harvard Business 
Review, 46:1 (January-February 1968), pp. 53-62.
Loyalty programs have become commonplace in the travel industry, offered by all major airlines, hotel chains, and car-rental firms. Until the rise of inter-net-based travel intermediaries, the decisions regarding the structure of ho-
tel chains’ loyalty programs were driven by the chains’ own market considerations. 
However, because the internet intermediaries use a merchant model, in which they 
purchase discounted inventory and sell it at a markup, the chains’ loyalty-program 
decisions are complicated.
ily because of the penetration of online inter-
mediaries into the business-travel market. The 
dilemma for the hotel chains is as follows. On 
one hand, do the hotel chains deny points for 
intermediary bookings in hopes of gaining di-
rect bookings (and, presumably higher ADRs), 
or, on the other hand, should the hotels offer 
points for intermediary bookings, given the 
relationship-enhancing and customer-track-
ing values of those online bookings? Similarly, 
intermediaries face their own loyalty-point-
program dilemma. Do they add to their over-
head by incurring the considerable cost of cre-
ating their own loyalty programs, or do they 
find some way to cooperate with chains (and 
other suppliers) to provide a program? 
To examine the loyalty-program issue 
currently facing major chains and online in-
termediaries, in 2004 and 2005 we conducted 
a series of interviews with senior executives 
of five of the ten largest hotel chains and the 
three largest online intermediaries. In con-
junction with our interviews and analysis, we 
note a series of events that allow predictions 
to be made regarding the likely outcomes for 
these major competitors who are at the same 
time online channel partners. 
In the following sections, we first provide 
insight into the divergent views regarding the 
disposition of loyalty points, and then we ex-
amine customer behavior regarding the use 
of these points. Next, we estimate the mone-
tary value of a loyalty point and use game the-
ory to examine the likely outcome of chains’ 
awarding loyalty points for merchant book-
ings. Finally, we discuss the pros and cons of 
intermediaries’ developing their own loyalty 
programs.
 Awarding Points for Merchant 
Bookings:  
The Hotels’ View
Most major-hotel-chain executives see loyalty 
points as a resource that gives them a com-
petitive advantage. Loyalty points have the 
following benefits for the chains: (1) Offering 
points encourages a direct, relatively low-cost 
booking; (2) Point programs assist in main-
taining guests’ loyalty; (3) Point programs fa-
cilitate better service by giving providers more 
information on their guests; and (4) Guests’ 
participation builds a database the chains 
can use to track customers, offer promotions, 
and engage in customer relationship market-
ing. Likewise, online intermediaries perceive 
loyalty points as a maintenance factor in at-
tracting business clients. That is, the absence 
of loyalty points will create dissatisfaction, but 
their presence, in and of themselves, will not 
create satisfaction.1 
An Examination of 
Internet Intermediaries 
and Hotel Loyalty 
Programs:
How Will Guests Get their Points? 
 
by Bill Carroll and Judy A. Siguaw
Specifically, the following two key issues 
are emerging around loyalty programs. First, 
should a hotel chain award loyalty points for 
intermediary-merchant bookings? Because of 
the merchant model, these bookings have a 
high net cost to the hotel, with the hotel trad-
ing online display position or making invento-
ry available for a reduction in its own margin. 
Second, on the other hand, should the inter-
mediaries themselves launch their own loyalty 
programs that reward hotel bookings? 
These issues have come to the forefront of 
managerial concern for both parties primar-
Exhibit 1
Costs and benefits of loyalty points for the hotel chain
Margin-saving benefit of a 
direct booking rather than an 
online intermediary-merchant 
booking
 
Net revenue benefit of a 
general share shift (or share 
maintenance) occasioned by 
loyal, point-motivated guests
 
Promotional value of direct 
marketing to a loyalty 
program member database
Cost of redeeming points
Program administrative costs
Costs Benefits
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  Hotel chains and online intermedi-
aries are in various stages of negotiation over 
awarding points for business-traveler transac-
tions. At the core of those negotiations is the 
points’ ownership by and their value to the 
hotel chains. As illustrated in Exhibit 1, two 
expenses are associated with loyalty points: 
the cost of redeeming the points and the cost 
of administering the loyalty program. 
The majority of chain executives whom 
we interviewed felt strongly that their loyal-
ty-program value is enhanced by the fact that 
points are not awarded for merchant bookings. 
These executives viewed loyalty programs as 
an investment in their customers for the pur-
pose of obtaining a share of those customers’ 
travel budgets. Our check of the top hotel loy-
alty-program call centers (see Exhibit 2) found 
that they all restrict the means by which mem-
bers may earn points and enhanced tier sta-
tus to a direct purchase from the hotel chain 
or an indirect purchase through a traditional 
travel agent. The chain executives imply that 
stays booked using intermediaries’ merchant 
models are not considered valid in chains’ loy-
alty programs.
The Intermediaries’ View
For online intermediaries, the impetus to get 
the chains to award points for third-party 
transactions lies with the potential they see in 
gaining a greater slice of the business market. 
The three online intermediaries we studied, 
Expedia, Travelocity, and Orbitz, have specifi-
cally targeted this segment in two areas—lightly 
managed business travel and corporate business 
travel. These two segments are seen as moving 
online at a growing pace (see Exhibit 3). 
The lightly managed travel segment com-
prises firms that annually spend between 
$500,000 and $2.0 million on air travel. Those 
firms have an opportunity to gain cost advan-
tages from managing travel through a formal 
corporate travel-management program (in-
cluding staff, systems, and an agency). 
We expect that lightly managed business 
travel will be a lucrative segment for online 
intermediaries, provided those intermediaries 
can extend their merchant programs to this 
business segment. Online intermediaries’ tac-
tics for attracting the lightly managed segment 
include offering low-cost, per-use, self-man-
aged travel through online applications that 
support travel-policy enforcement, expense 
reporting, and self-booking. These features 
are combined with call-center support and 
offering discount air, hotel, and rental-car in-
ventory. The intermediaries maintain a differ-
ential fee structure according to whether trav-
elers book themselves electronically or require 
human assistance. Exhibit 4 shows an example 
of the elements incorporated into the Expedia 
Corporate Travel program.
The intermediaries will have to modify 
their programs if they wish to advance their 
business-related transactions. Specifically, the 
intermediaries’ successful extension into the 
business market with regard to hotels depends 
on the intermediaries’ ability to provide 
customers with the following three items: (1) 
value in the form of satisfactory travel service 
at a price lower than other providers, (2) access 
to sufficient hotel inventory, and (3) some 
kind of premium for patronage, whether hotel 
chains’ loyalty points or the intermediaries’ 
own programs. 
The online intermediaries’ success also 
depends on their ability to draw market share 
from enterprises that currently serve the busi-
ness segment—including the hotel companies 
themselves, traditional  travel agencies, and 
travel-management companies. These other 
players provide value, provide access to chains’ 
loyalty points, and offer hotel inventory, but 
the third-party sources (travel agents and 
travel-management companies) do not yet 
have merchant programs. Only time will tell 
if online intermediaries can match or beat the 
value provided by the chains. 
Web-based intermediaries’ ability to con-
tinue acquiring merchant inventory from the 
hotel chains depends on the intermediaries’ 
ability to create a competitive threat or offer an 
opportunity for the chains. The chief concern 
for the chains is whether the internet interme-
diaries will have sufficient marketing clout to 
shift business away from the hotel chains (and 
their loyalty programs) toward:
• independent (non-chain) properties (with 
or without their own point programs); 
• chains that offer points and are promoted 
(or more favorably displayed) by the in-
termediary as a “point-awarding” busi-
ness-program participant; or 
• chains that don’t award frequent-guest 
points, but have some other particular at-
traction for the intermediaries’ customers 
(e.g., a favorable price).
If the intermediaries can demonstrate the 
power to shift market share at will, then the 
point-awarding hotel chains will be forced to 
accede to the intermediaries’ demand to allow 
points for their transactions. 
Exhibit 2
Hotel loyalty programs call centers surveyed
Exhibit 3
Estimated growth in online business bookings
Exhibit 4
Sample internet-intermediary merchant website showing 
corporate-travel program: Expedia
Best Western Gold Crown Club International 
Cendant TripRewards
Fairmont President’s Club
Hilton HHonors 
Hyatt Gold Passport 
Marriott RewardsPriority Club Worldwide
Starwood Preferred Guest
Wyndham By-Request
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Intermediaries believe that they need to 
be able to grant loyalty points to make their 
model more competitive. Hotel chains might 
be willing to award points for merchant book-
ings to the extent that the chains see value in 
tracking guests’ purchases through all chan-
nels. The chains might want to be able to mea-
sure guest allegiance (as assessed by room-
nights or spending) and to reward a loyal 
guest for choosing the brand, regardless of the 
purchase channel used. So, chains may decide 
to award points through internet intermedi-
aries if the value of marketing data regarding 
guests who use those intermediaries and the 
intermediaries’ ability to shift market share 
exceeds the cost of awarding points for mer-
chant bookings. 
Loyalty Points:  
Travelers’ Expectations and the Cost 
of Doing Business 
Membership in hotel loyalty programs is grow-
ing.2 From 2003 to 2004, memberships indus-
try-wide expanded by 12 percent. Marriott and 
Hilton have over 15 million members in each 
of their loyalty programs, while Wyndham 
has over one million members. While the po-
tential marketing reach of such programs is 
considerable, so is the cost of developing and 
administering them. Unofficial estimates of 
administrative costs run between $2 and $3 
per member, and communication costs range 
from $2 to $6 depending on the level of activity. 
One side benefit of the internet is that com-
munication costs are being lowered by direct 
e-mail programs, which are estimated to cost 
just 2 percent of generated revenue.
Our interviews with chain executives sug-
gest that the chains will continue to invest 
in loyalty programs. While chain executives 
generally tout the benefits of their programs, 
data and research findings concerning loy-
alty programs is equivocal. Several research 
studies indicate that loyalty programs are the 
key determinant in the purchase process for 
only 4 to 7 percent of guests.3 The research has 
shown that travelers select hotels first on the 
basis of location, price, and amenities. In con-
trast, loyalty points have only a limited influ-
ence on the purchase decision. Furthermore, 
studies of the short- and long-term effects of 
membership programs on loyalty across all 
consumer industries suggest negligible net re-
turns. At worst, consumers simply continue 
to buy what they have previously bought, ex-
cept that they earn points for a purchase they 
would arguably have made anyway. One study, 
for example, reported that the majority of loy-
alty program members do not believe that 
their program memberships add value or con-
tribute to their commitment or loyalty. Other 
research found that loyalty programs create 
spurious loyalty, and any repeat purchases are 
not a proxy for customer satisfaction or psy-
chological commitment.4 These latter works 
concluded that loyalty programs are not meet-
ing their objectives. We received a tenative 
confirmation of the above findings from the 
chain executives who, even as they boasted 
of increases in share due to their loyalty pro-
grams, admitted that upwards of 80 percent of 
their program’s members also belong to com-
petitors’ loyalty programs.
The research on loyalty programs is not 
all negative. One study suggests the following 
benefits from loyalty programs: hotel loyalty 
program members are twice as likely to make 
a repeat purchase as non-members; and they 
spend more per room, have lower price sen-
sitivity, and experience greater satisfaction.5 
Similarly, results of another study show that 
loyalty programs which provide economic in-
centives promote both customer retention and 
customer-share development. However, the 
statistical effect of loyalty programs on these 
variables is small.6 
Regardless of the marketing effect, gen-
eral agreement exists among chain executives 
and scholarly researchers that loyalty pro-
grams create databases rich in customer infor-
mation, especially regarding frequency of stay, 
spending levels, preferences, and profitability.7 
This information can improve customer rela-
tionship management (CRM) efforts. Some of 
that benefit is negated, however, because 15 to 
30 percent of a hotel chain’s database typically 
is incomplete or inaccurate.8 The challenge for 
lodging organizations is to appropriately capi-
talize on the information through effectively 
targeted promotions to carefully defined sets 
of consumers. What complicates the effort is 
that anyone can join these programs without 
ever having stayed at the hotel (or, more likely, 
after logging just one stay), a strategy contrary 
to the  exclusive-membership approach sug-
gested by marketing research.9 As a result, ho-
tel chains have compiled huge databases that 
are costly to maintain and so large as to make 
data analysis difficult. 10 
The chief reason we see for the growth in 
hospitality loyalty programs is competitive 
response. As each chain implemented and 
then expanded its program, others followed 
suit to remain at parity with competitors. Thus, 
even though one goal of loyalty programs 
was supposedly to cement a competitive 
advantage, they no longer constitute a key 
differentiator. Initial consumer excitement 
over program offerings has dwindled, 
especially as consumers have learned that 
rewards frequently are limited. 
Another putative reason for operating 
loyalty programs is facilitating customer satis-
faction.11 This reason has gained support from 
research indicating that members of affiliation 
programs are more likely to express greater 
satisfaction with the chain and to ignore nega-
tive evaluations from other sources. One other 
point regarding loyalty programs is that busi-
ness customers have come to expect points for 
their hotel stays. Those customers are likely to 
respond negatively when they cannot obtain 
points, such as with merchant-rate bookings.
To summarize our discussion of hotel 
loyalty programs, they appear to allow hotel 
operators to track their customers’ purchas-
ing habits, thus enabling effective guest pro-
motion and recognition. However, contrary to 
the beliefs of the chain executives, the avail-
able evidence indicates that loyalty programs 
have little influence on consumer decision-
making or guest loyalty. 
Value of Loyalty Points 
Despite the conclusions that we just stated, we 
repeat that the chain executives cited the abil-
ity to gain market share or retain a customer 
base as a major value of their loyalty programs. 
Though their value as a purchase 
motivator is not certain, loyalty programs 
yield a rich database of guest information.
3 Barsky and Lin, p. 10; John Deighton and Stowe 
Shoemaker, “Hilton HHonors Worldwide: Loyalty Wars,” 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, Case N9-501-
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4 Duarte B. Morais, Michael J. Dorsch, and Sheila J. 
Backman, “Can Tourism Providers Buy Their Customers’ 
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Investments on Loyalty,” Journal of Travel Research, Vol. 42 
(February 2004), pp. 235-243; and Randall Whyte, “Frequent 
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Create Spurious Loyalty?,”Journal of Targeting, Measuring, 
and Marketing, Vol. 12 (March 2004), pp. 269-280. 
5 Barsky  and Lin, p. 10.
6 Peter C. Verhoef, Understanding the Effect of 
Customer Relationship Management Efforts on Customer 
Retention and Customer-share Development, Journal of 
Marketing, Vol. 67 (October 2003), pp. 30-45.
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Create Strategic Databases,” Marketing News, Vol. 31 
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8 Ibid.
9 Ran Kivetz and Itamar Simonson, “The Idiosyncratic 
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Marketing Research, Vol. 40 (November 2003), pp. 454-467.
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This value is derived from the net contribu-
tion of incremental rooms sold versus the cost 
of granting  free rooms (or points traded for 
other goods and services), plus the expense of 
program administration. Indeed, programs’ ad-
ministrative costs may be considerably higher 
than the cost of the actual awards. Potential 
value also exists in acquiring customer infor-
mation to facilitate promotions, direct mar-
keting, and relationship building. Ultimately, 
that value, too, should come in the form of 
incremental or retained business.
For the traveler, point value equals the free 
or discounted hotel services or other items 
purchased with the loyalty points. Guests also 
reap the psychological value of being identi-
fied by the chain and its properties as a fre-
quent guest, which accrues certain benefits, 
including special toll-free numbers, identifica-
tion on web sites, special check-in areas, iden-
tification by and added attention from staff as 
frequent guests, and upgraded room assign-
ments, room amenities, and services.
The value to the intermediary of being 
able to distribute chain loyalty points is the 
chance to  gain or retain more customers. This 
may only require the awarding of loyal points 
to create the perception that the intermediary 
is a full business-service provider. 
Notwithstanding our discussion so far, 
the actual value of loyalty points is modest, 
when one considers what a consumer can re-
ceive in exchange for points.  From web-based 
information, we developed an estimate of the 
typical value of points of no more than one-
half cent per point, as shown in Exhibit 5. At 
that rate, the total exchange value earned for 
a two-day stay at a major chain hotel trans-
lates into a prospective benefit ranging from 
$8.50 to $13.50, given certain assumptions 
about the rate paid (say, $200 to $300 per two-
night stay), brand category, and the following: 
(1) no promotional offers, (2) standard point 
rewards only, (3) typical brand for the chain, 
and (4) lowest loyalty membership level. 
Most of the chain executives whom we 
interviewed suggested that guests place a far 
greater value on the prospects of earning free 
accommodations for personal and family 
vacations than the exchange value that we 
calculated for the points. Exhibit 6 provides 
illustrations of the point accumulations 
needed for a two-day, weekend stay at a 
typical property for major U.S. chains and the 
associated number of room-nights needed 
to accumulate those points. Note that this 
calculation is for illustrative purposes only 
and does not reflect price point values or 
the complexity of individual program point 
awards and redemption values.
The real expected (marginal) cost of points 
that are redeemed for property stays cannot 
be determined. Not only is that information 
confidential, but it relates to both the variable 
or opportunity costs of making the rooms 
available and to the likelihood of points’ ac-
tually being redeemed. We can, however, es-
timate the “near-money” value of points from 
the minimum price a chain is willing to accept 
for a point that is explicitly exchanged for the 
goods and services that constitute program re-
wards. As suggested in Exhibit 5, such values 
range from two to five mills per point, or $4.77 
to $11.25 per average two-day stay, assuming 
that the points are redeemed. That is not a fair 
assumption, though, because industry esti-
mates suggest that fewer than 30 percent of 
program members ever redeem their points. 
Thus, the expected cost to the chain of guests’ 
point acquisitions may range from $1.43 and 
$3.38 per average two-day stay, assuming that 
point use is evenly distributed among those 
who redeem them. Stated another way, the 
chains appear to be willing to forgo between 
$1.43 and $3.38 for a typical two-day stay to 
gain the possible benefits from their loyalty 
program. 
Returning to the issue of negotiations 
between chains and intermediaries over the 
awarding of chain loyalty points for merchant 
bookings, the calculation that we just present-
ed indicates that allowing the internet agencies 
to grant points would not result in particularly 
large monetary expenses. Given the low actu-
al expense of redeemed points, to the extent 
that awarding points for merchant bookings 
allows chains to better track guests’ behavior, 
establish deeper relationships through rec-
ognition, and direct market more effectively, 
chains may find value in granting points even 
for merchant bookings. Moreover, as we illus-
trate below, there may be an additional advan-
tage for a chain to be the first to award points 
for merchant bookings.
One particular implication of our calcu-
lation is that if a chain estimates the value of 
its points as being too high for full awards on 
merchant-based transactions, it could appro-
priately reduce the number of points awarded 
for those merchant bookings, but it would still 
gain the tracking value of the transaction for 
guest-recognition purposes. Another way to 
gain guest information at modest cost would 
be to restrict point awards to a particular class 
of merchant rates, specifically, those intended 
for business customers who the hotel opera-
tors believe will offer high future value, but 
not to leisure travelers. Some chains do some-
thing similar for travel agency bookings based 
on the type of rate booked. 
Having just made that proposal, we must 
note research that suggests that frequent busi-
ness travelers can be less profitable on a per-
transaction basis than leisure guests. This is 
because frequent guests expect rewards, dis-
counts, upgrades, and special amenities,  while 
leisure or infrequent customers are more like-
ly to accept a relatively high price category and 
have no expectations about special benefits.12 
Chain
 Choice
 Hilton
 Marriott 
 Starwood
 InterContinental
 Cendant
Point Program
 Choice Privileges
 HHonors
 Marriott Rewards
 Preferred Guest
 Priority Club
 Trip Rewards
Points Required 
for a $US100 Gift 
Certificate
 32,000
 40,000
 33,000 
 19,000
 38,000
 20,500
$US Value per 
Point 
(1)
 $0.0031
 $0.0025
 $0.0030
 $0.0053
 $0.0026
 $0.0049
Point Award for 
a Two-day Stay 
(2)
 2,000
 4,500
 3,000
 900
 4,000
 2,000
Point Value of a 
Two-day Stay 
(1) X (2)
 $6.20
 $11.25
 $9.00
 $4.77
 $10.40
 $9.80
Notes: Values are calculated based on Points.com and the chains’ websites. Gift certificates may 
be exchanged for various retail items, as well as hotel stays. The items and retail outlets differ by 
chain program. Some programs work with more partners than others. InterContinental, Marriott, 
and Hilton points were estimated on $150 per night. Choice and Cendant were estimated on 
$100 per night.
Exhibit 5
Exchange value of hotel-chain loyalty points
 Chain Hotel Brand  Point Program  
 Cendant Ramada  Trip Rewards 20,000 15
 Choice Clarion  Choice Privileges 12,000 12
 Hilton Hilton  HHonors 20,000 9
 IHG InterContinental  Priority Club 25,000 13
 Marriott Various Marriott Rewards 38,000 19
 Starwood Various Starwood Preferred Guest 14,000 23
Exhibit 6
Illustration of points needed for a two-day hotel stay
Number of Days 
Needed to Earn a 
Weekend Stay
Points 
Required for 
Two-day Stay
12 Judy A. Siguaw, Penny M. Simpson, and Ali Kasikci, 
“One Night Stands and Long-Term Relationships: A Case 
Study of Satisfaction and Loyalty,” Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Center of Hospitality Research Case Study, 2004.
  • hoTel- Chain loyalTy poinTs  Cornell UniversiTy • The CenTer for hospiTaliTy researCh  The CenTer for hospiTaliTy researCh • Cornell UniversiTy  hoTel- Chain loyalTy poinTs • 
The Cost of Offering No Points
Beyond the chains’ explicit calculation of costs 
and benefits of awarding points for merchant-
rate purchases is the implicit value of punish-
ing a guest by giving no points for booking at 
a merchant site (even though the guest is not 
aware of the mechanics of the merchant trans-
action). For the guest, the choice of booking 
site and rate used stems from convenience or 
savings. Although the guest is not being ma-
levolent in making such a choice, most major 
chains choose to punish their loyal guests by 
giving no points unless they book through the 
favored channels. If guests view that policy as 
punitive, the chain could lose market share and 
goodwill. We cannot explicitly measure this 
effect, but it certainly exists. Even worse, we 
have heard anecdotes to the effect that some 
hotels actually taunt guests who have booked 
through online intermediaries by placing 
cards in the guest room stating that the guest 
could have had a better room or amenities by 
booking directly with the hotel chain. If that 
report is true, we suggest that some proper-
ties are irrationally placing potentially  lucra-
tive guests in the middle of the battle with the 
online intermediaries. 
Gaming the Chains’ Decision 
To return to the heart of the decision of whether 
to give loyalty points with merchant bookings, 
chains must decide whether the value of direct 
booking revenues lost to intermediaries (which 
Exhibit 7
Strategic-payoff analysis of decision to award loyalty points for merchant transactions
 Neutral position
Both chains retain their 
relative market share, 
tracking, and customer 
relationships.
 Chain B gains
 Chain A loses
Chain A gains 
 
 
Chain B loses
Unstable option
Either chain could take 
advantage by changing to an 
“award points” strategy.
 This could be a stable option 
if chains could trust one 
another (to hold firm in not 
awarding points).
Award Points
Aw
ar
d 
Po
in
ts
Don’t Award Points
D
on
’t
 A
w
ar
d 
Po
in
ts
Ch
a
in
 b
Chain a
Note: The strategic gain in this instance could include a positive share shift in room revenue, enhanced 
customer relationships, and tracking.  By the same token, the strategic loss would see reductions in 
room revenue, reduced customer relationships, and the loss of customer tracking.
is an 18- to 25-percent markup for forgone 
bookings) is less than the incremental value 
of guest information and satisfaction gained 
from offering those points. As we discuss below, 
the chains must also consider the possibility 
that one or another chain will attempt to steal 
market share by making a loyalty-point ar-
rangement with an internet intermediary.
We developed a theoretical model of this 
decision, in which two rival chains individu-
ally but interdependently evaluate whether to 
award points for merchant-business bookings. 
In developing this model, we assume that an 
intermediary has sufficient market power to 
create gains for a chain that grants points and 
concomitant losses if the chain doesn’t grant 
points. Although this simple analysis involves 
just two chains, the analysis would be gener-
ally the same with any number of rivals; the 
calculation would simply be more complicat-
ed (and the mechanics of the resulting game 
theory is beyond this paper). 
Using the classic payoff matrix from tradi-
tional game theory, as shown in Exhibit 7, sup-
pose that chain A and chain B are individually 
strategizing about granting points for mer-
chant-rate bookings made by an intermediary. 
In either case a decision can substantially in-
crease the number of bookings for the chain’s 
properties or diminish that number, and the 
selected policy can either add to or reduce 
the value of tracked customer information for 
marketing promotion and guest recognition. 
This is not necessarily a zero-sum game, as it 
allows for potential gain or loss in share for 
other properties represented by the interme-
diary, but not associated with chains A or B. 
In this analysis, chain A and chain B each 
have just two possible strategies: (1) award 
points for merchant bookings, or (2) do not 
award them. The consequences or potential 
outcomes of those decisions shown in the 
Exhibit 7 reflect interdependent gains and 
losses plus gains from and losses to the in-
termediary and other chains. We assume that 
both chain A and B can quantify, or at least 
rank, net effects of their own and their rivals’ 
strategy options. Exhibit 8 shows the outcome 
Exhibit 8
Potential rewards and penalties for chains that allow merchant intermediaries to award loyalty points
Rewards
More-prominent display position for chain 
properties
Information tracking with loyalty club 
number for bookings and searches
Promotions using points to encourage 
travel and enhance yield in off-peak and 
low-occupancy periods 
Public-relations and communications 
(marketing fund) program
Improved customer relationship for point-
collecting customer
Improved tracking of frequent or loyal 
customers for recognition at points of 
contact with the chain and its properties 
(e.g., reservations center and property)
Penalties
Less-prominent display position for chain 
properties
No tracking of loyalty-club members’ 
bookings and searches
No promotions with points
No program
Reduced customer relationship for point-
collecting customers
Loss of tracking for frequent or loyal 
customers booking merchant rates
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if one of the chains awards points but the oth-
er does not. In this case, the point-awarding 
(cooperating) chain gains share and the non-
point-awarding (non-cooperating) one loses 
share, according to the intermediary’s capabil-
ity to shift incremental bookings. 
The current situation among U.S. ho-
tel chains is represented by the situation in 
which  one chain chooses not to award points 
based on the premise that its rivals will also 
not award them. We see this strategy as be-
ing risky, because of the incentive for a rival 
to decide to cooperate with the intermediary 
(i.e., award points) and thus gain share. As we 
suggest below, there is precedent for this sort 
of action among U.S.-based hotel chains. In 
contrast, the game-theory logic of Exhibit 7 
suggests that the rival chains are likely to elect 
an “award points” strategy (assuming the in-
termediaries can, in fact, shift sufficient de-
mand to make this choice worthwhile). Thus, 
the worst outcome of the decision to award 
points would be for a chain to achieve a neu-
tral position vis-à-vis its rivals, while the best 
outcome would be a temporary advantage, if 
a chain moves first. This will be the optimal, 
low-risk strategy.
The industry’s structure creates what we 
believe is a compelling argument for award-
ing points through merchant-based sales, as 
follows.
• A handful of major chains account for a 
large percentage of total bookings in the 
category of properties that compete with 
one another for business customers. 
• All the major chains have made significant 
investments in their loyalty programs. 
• All chain executives interviewed claimed 
significant value in the information-track-
ing and customer-relationship value of 
awarding points and point programs. 
• Several major chains already participate 
in merchant programs for their leisure-
travel customers. 
• Some chains are already in negotiations 
with intermediaries over awarding points 
for merchant bookings for business cus-
tomers. Some provide retail rates to third 
parties with less restrictive conditions 
than other chains require, such as no pre-
payment.
• When the InterContinental Hotel 
Group (IHG) withdrew from Expedia 
in November 2004, several other chains 
elected not to follow, presumably gaining 
market share at IHG’s expense. 
• Major chains frequently take actions con-
trary to their public statements. For ex-
ample, Marriott “broke ranks” and signed 
an agreement with Expedia to offer mer-
chant rates.
• Finally, notwithstanding the absence of 
an agreement at the chain level, loyalty-
program members who book a chain ho-
tel room with an online intermediary may 
display their membership cards at check-
in and obtain points if the property agrees 
to grant them.
The growth of online travel intermedi-
aries generates pressure on chains to award 
points. Three online intermediaries are work-
ing on entering the business market, name-
ly, Expedia (Expedia, Expedia Corporate, 
Hotels.com, Hotwire, and e-Long), Cendant 
(including Orbitz), and Sabre’s Travelocity. 
According to PhoCusWright,13 these services 
account for: 
• 88 percent of total online intermediary 
gross hospitality revenues, 
• 46 percent of gross hospitality online rev-
enues, and
• 9 percent of total hospitality revenue. 
If current trends continue, the three in-
termediaries will account for 15 percent of 
total hospitality revenues by the end of 2006. 
Because of their broad market reach, the on-
line intermediaries will be able to influence 
purchasers in choosing a hotel. They will also 
control increasingly greater quantities of in-
formation about a chain’s guests, who have 
become the intermediaries’ own customers. 
Furthermore, they will be in an even better 
position to support participating chains’ ef-
forts to track, recognize, and promote to their 
loyal customers. 
Fait accompli at check-in. To expand on 
our point above, the local properties may not 
support their chain’s decision not to award 
points for merchant bookings. Some chains 
have tried to systematically prohibit point 
awards through the local property manage-
ment system (PMS) or effectively enforce such 
a policy at the property level. Others have tried 
to purge points granted on merchant rates. On 
the other hand, some chains may have the ca-
pability to prohibit point awards, but choose 
not to do so. Regardless of the chain’s posi-
tion, it is still the front-line staff members who 
must disappoint the point-saving guest either 
by openly denying points or  by surreptitious-
ly purging awards. Faced with that choice, the 
employee most likely will simply give a guest 
points despite the booking source or rate. 
Indeed, after stating their policy of no points 
for merchant bookings, two of the top-ten 
loyalty-program call centers admitted that the 
properties will likely award points if the guest 
presents the loyalty-program card at check-in. 
This last scenario, however, is the worst one for 
the property owner, who pays the chain for the 
points awarded, incurs a lower average daily 
rate (ADR) from the merchant booking, and 
loses share to local competitors with chains 
that are supported by intermediaries because 
they provide points on merchant bookings. 
The Case For and Against 
Intermediary Point Programs
It may be that the decision regarding awarding 
loyalty points for merchant transactions will 
effectively be moot. Loyalty points and pro-
grams seem to be losing some of their cachet. 
Hotel points are being traded on Points.com 
and other similar web sites, and they can be 
combined with points earned on air and car 
bookings—both of which occur for points 
related to intermediary bookings. In addition, 
consumers can choose to purchase their way 
into higher levels of loyalty programs rather 
than redeem points for further room stays. 
Points are being traded for gift certificates, cash 
back, discounts, merchandise, and travel.14 As 
a result, loyalty points are morphing into the 
equivalent of the old S&H Green Stamps—that 
is, a form of scrip given for one’s business that 
is redeemable for other goods and services. 
To the extent that loyalty points become a 
commodity, what value they had in fostering 
chain loyalty diminishes. Simultaneously, on-
line travel intermediaries will find it increas-
ingly easier to build their own loyalty pro-
grams. Indeed, we see a compelling case for 
intermediaries to develop their own loyalty 
programs. 
We believe that consumers would respond 
favorably to loyalty programs offered by on-
line intermediaries, since they will earn points 
for all bookings, regardless of which chain 
they patronize. Beyond consumers’ response, 
the intermediaries will benefit from knowl-
edge about a much broader array of consum-
ers’ travel habits—as will the companies that 
are willing to pay for that information. This 
knowledge will also allow an individual firm 
to truly understand the share of the travel wal-
let it is obtaining from its guests. 
The intermediaries are not blind to 
this opportunity. Lodging.com has already 
launched a modest loyalty program, but that 
14 Hotel News Resource, “Customers Play ‘Bait and 
Switch’ on Rewards Programs,” www.hotelnewsresource.
com/news_print.php?sid=12667, September 1, 2004.
If current trends continue, three internet 
intermediaries will soon account for 15 
percent of total hospitality revenues.
13 William Carroll and Lorraine Sileo, “Hotel and 
Lodging,” PhoCusWright Online Travel Overview 2004-
2006, PhoCusWright, June 2004.
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program does not operate on the scale we 
foresee, and certainly not at the level of ho-
tel chain, airline, and car-rental programs. 
Travelocity appears to be launching its own 
reward program on two levels. For the average 
consumer, Travelocity is offering a variety of 
gift certificates and discounts. For top bookers, 
Travelocity is testing an invitation-only “VIP 
Program,” which waives service fees and offers 
such perks as “a dedicated toll-free number 
for priority customer service, and meaningful, 
tangible, and easy-to-redeem benefits.”15  The 
VIPs also receive “surprise and delight offers.” 
We conclude that other intermediaries have 
not launched programs because they have 
judged them to be too costly to administer 
relative to benefits or they have determined 
that other ways to spend the same money will 
produce better returns. Furthermore, since 
airlines and car-rental agencies already give 
points for online intermediary bookings, the 
intermediaries might just be waiting until the 
chains begin capitulating, as they surely will. 
Conclusions
We expect that eventually all major chains will 
offer points for internet merchant-rate book-
ings. That said, we suggest that major online 
intermediaries give temporary advantage to the 
chain that is the first mover in granting points. 
We suggest that the initial deals should involve 
temporary exclusivity or a more lucrative deal 
than can be sustained. Almost inevitably, other 
chains will match the first mover’s initiative. 
At that point exclusivity and favorable deals 
will disappear.
Although the actual cash value of loyalty 
points is small, they carry substantial market-
ing value from the perception of point awards 
as being part of a “full service business travel 
intermediary.” In view of this perception, we 
suggest that chains initially give point awards 
that are less than those granted for direct chain 
bookings or for non-merchant (retail) book-
ings. Even if chains do try this tactic, howev-
er, they will eventually have to give full-value 
awards for all purchases, regardless of the sales 
channel involved. 
Another way to soften the blow of award-
ing points for internet intermediaries’ transac-
tions is to create a different award class, call it 
“business merchant rates.” This would be a new 
form of net rate with fewer restrictions, higher 
sell rates, and lesser margins than leisure rates. 
Since these rates are more likely to be used by 
a chain’s loyal guests, their benefits of tracking 
for promotion and recognition have consider-
able value. In this scenario, awarding points 
becomes a bargaining chip for the chain in its 
negotiations with intermediaries. 
Finally, we do not foresee most online in-
termediaries developing a program of their 
own, at least until they can exaust the option 
of a cooperative program with hotels or oth-
er travel services providers. In the near term, 
we suggest that the chains’ programs already 
fulfill this function. Already Expedia (with 74 
percent of the hotel merchant market), has 
said that it does not plan to offer its own pro-
gram. Travelocity’s program has not yet been 
shown to shift share as it is still in beta-testing. 
Instead, the internet intermediaries should do 
what they do best, which is to find a partner 
and promote that chain through display po-
sitioning. n
We expect that eventually all major chains 
will offer points for internet merchant-
rate bookings.
15 www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2005-11/ar-
tikel-5547739.asp, as viewed February 9, 2006.
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